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CELL PHONES AND THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION: 
CIRCUITS SPLIT OVER THE LINE BETWEEN 
SOVEREIGNTY AND PRIVACY 
GINA R. BOHANNON∗ 
Traditionally, the United States government has had plenary authority 
to conduct warrantless searches at the international border, and its functional 
equivalent.1  The border search exception allows U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (“CBP”) and other Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
personnel to search persons and property entering or exiting the country with-
out obtaining a warrant or, in most cases, articulating any particularized sus-
picion for the search.2  At a growing rate, in addition to x-raying luggage, 
opening vehicle trunks, and sifting through other containers, CBP personnel 
have collected cell phones, laptops, and other electronic devices carried 
across the border and manually examined or downloaded and forensically 
searched their digital contents.3 
In light of growing privacy concerns and the United States Supreme 
Court’s recent limitations on cell phone searches under other traditional war-
rant exceptions,4 some travelers have argued that the warrantless search of 
their cell phones, though conducted upon entering or exiting the country, vi-
olates the Fourth Amendment.5  With no direct ruling from the Supreme 
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 1.  United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004) (quoting United States v. Mon-
toya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)). 
 2.  Id. at 152 (quoting Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538) (“Routine searches of the 
persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable 
cause, or warrant . . . .”).   
 3.  CBP Releases Statistics on Electronic Device Searches, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-re-
leases-statistics-electronic-device-searches-0 [hereinafter CBP Releases Statistics]. 
 4.  See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 5.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding the government cannot 
obtain cell site location information from a third party without a warrant supported by probable 
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Court, the federal circuit courts have come to diverging conclusions about 
whether the contours of the border search exception include any or all cell 
phone searches.6 
Part I of this Comment will discuss how the Supreme Court recently 
limited the scope of traditional warrantless investigations, including the third-
party doctrine and the search incident to arrest exception, when applied to 
cell phone records and data.7  Part I will also discuss the Court’s recognition 
and development of the border search exception, DHS’s interpretation of 
their authority to search electronic devices under the border search exception, 
and legislative proposals to limit that authority.8  Finally, Part I will describe 
the circuit split over the question of what, if any, level of individual suspicion 
is required by the Fourth Amendment for the government to conduct a search 
of a cell phone at the international border.9 
Part II of this Comment will argue that cell phone searches should be 
considered beyond the scope of the border search exception because of 
heightened individual privacy interests in cell phones and the diminished 
government interest in the search of digital content at the border.10  Part II 
will also question whether creating different standards for manual and foren-
sic searches of cell phones and other electronic devices reflects a meaningful 
distinction based on the intrusiveness of the search and provides a workable 
rule for technology that is continuously evolving.11  Finally, Part II will con-
clude that establishing a warrant requirement for electronic device searches 
at the border would adequately protect individual privacy interests and reflect 
the Supreme Court’s precedent.12 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Customs officers have traditionally conducted routine searches of items 
entering the United States absent a warrant or probable cause without con-
travening the Fourth Amendment.13  Today, judges and policymakers are re-
assessing the balance between the legitimate interests of the government at 
the border in conducting warrantless investigations and the privacy interests 
at stake in discretionary searches of cell phones and other personal electronic 
                                                          
cause); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding the government cannot search a cell 
phone incident to arrest without a warrant supported by probable cause); see infra Section I.C.  
 6.  See infra Section I.C. 
 7.  See infra Section I.A. 
 8.  See infra Section I.B. 
 9.  See infra Section I.C. 
 10.  See infra Section II.A. 
 11.  See infra Section II.B. 
 12.  See infra Section II.C. 
 13.  See infra Section I.B.1. 
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devices.14  This Part first discusses how the Supreme Court has recently ap-
plied traditional Fourth Amendment principles to obtaining cell phone data 
in Carpenter v. United States15 and Riley v. California.16  Next, this Part dis-
cusses Supreme Court precedents, current executive policies, and proposed 
legislation governing the border exception and searches of electronic de-
vices.17  Finally, this Part describes the current circuit split over the question 
of what, if any, level of individualized suspicion is required for a border 
search of a cell phone.18 
A.  Digital Searches in the Fourth Amendment Framework 
Since the earliest calls for revolution against British rule, Americans 
have called for limitations on the government’s ability to conduct broad 
searches of private property.19  The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated; and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.20 
The drafters of the Fourth Amendment were immediately concerned 
with preventing the government from adopting the British practice of issuing 
general warrants or writs of assistance that allowed officers to conduct 
searches, unlimited in time or scope, of private property.21  As federal regu-
lation and investigative techniques have evolved over time, the Fourth 
Amendment continues to regulate the extent to which government intrusion 
into the privacies of individuals’ lives is permissible.22 
                                                          
 14.  See infra Section I.B–C. 
 15.  138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 16.  134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); see infra Section I.A. 
 17.  See infra Section I.B. 
 18.  See infra Section I.C. 
 19.  In colonial Massachusetts, James Otis challenged the legality of the use of general warrants 
issued by the British crown against colonists who expressed criticism of the King in a lengthy ora-
tion, which John Adams later described as a rallying cry against British rule.  See Riley v. California, 
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (“Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I 
did, ready to take arms against writs of assistance. . . .  Then and there the child Independence was 
born.” (quoting 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 247–48 (Charles F. Adams ed., Boston, Little, 
Brown & Co. 1856))); MASS. HISTORICAL SOC’Y, Legal Papers of John Adams, volume 2, ADAMS 
PAPERS DIGITAL EDITION (2018), http://www.masshist.org/publications/adams-pa-
pers/view?id=ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0002-0001#LJA02d034n1. 
 20.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 21.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
 22.  E.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (determining whether attaching GPS-
enabled tracking devices to a suspect’s vehicle violates the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (determining whether the use of a thermal imaging device to monitor 
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Courts use a two-part inquiry to determine whether the government con-
ducted an unconstitutional search.23  First, as a threshold matter, the court 
determines if the government’s actions constituted a search, or an intrusion 
of an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” triggering the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment.24  If so, the court evaluates whether the 
search was reasonable.25  Generally, a search that is executed in accordance 
with a valid warrant supported by probable cause is presumed reasonable.26  
However, some searches may be reasonable without a warrant if they are 
conducted pursuant to an established, well-delineated exception to the war-
rant requirement.27  Searches conducted pursuant to a valid warrant exception 
are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when “the nature and quality of 
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” are balanced 
“against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion.”28 
The ubiquitous use of electronic devices to store and communicate in-
formation has raised questions over how to apply traditional Fourth Amend-
ment doctrines developed for the physical world to digital content.29  The 
drafters of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights likely could not have im-
agined the scope of technological advances that today make information 
about personal lives so easily compressed, transported, copied, and searched.  
Even just ten years ago, lawmakers and judges perhaps did not contemplate 
the excessive amounts of personal data now found in small rectangular de-
vices most Americans carry with them at all hours of the day and nearly half 
                                                          
radiation of heat from a person’s home violates the Fourth Amendment); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Ex-
ecs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (determining whether a mandatory drug screening program for 
railroad workers involved in accidents violates the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696 (1983) (determining whether allowing a drug detection dog to sniff the outside of a bag 
violates the Fourth Amendment).  See generally DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN 
AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 23–55 (2017) (describing modern technologies and expanding governmen-
tal surveillance programs that raise Fourth Amendment concerns). 
 23.  See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (initially determining 
the acquisition of cell site location information (“CSLI”) was a search and subsequently determining 
the search was not reasonable and thus violated the Fourth Amendment).  
 24.  Id. at 2217 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
 25.  Id. at 2221. 
 26.  Id. at 2213 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). 
 27.  E.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (exigent circumstances); Horton v. Cal-
ifornia, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (plain view exception); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) 
(border exception); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to lawful arrest). 
 28.  O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 703 (1983)). 
 29.  See generally Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
531, 533 (2005) (discussing challenges in applying current law to searches and seizures of digital 
content). 
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of all Americans say they could not live without.30  Recently, in Carpenter v. 
United States and Riley v. California the Supreme Court addressed how the 
proliferation of smartphones informs the analysis of what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search and whether a search is reasonable.31 
1.  The Third-Party Doctrine—Carpenter v. United States 
In Carpenter v. United States, the Court addressed how cell site location 
information (“CSLI”), detailed records of a cell phone’s location held by a 
service provider,32 impacts the third-party doctrine.33  Traditionally, under 
the third-party doctrine, the government can secure records and data from 
third parties without a warrant based on the maxim that “a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties.”34  Carpenter, however, sought to suppress cell phone records 
the FBI obtained from MetroPCS and Sprint without a warrant, which placed 
his cell phone at the scene of multiple robberies, arguing that these records 
were beyond the scope of the third-party doctrine.35 
The Court agreed with Carpenter and distinguished CSLI from other 
“business records.”36  The Court determined that CSLI is not consistent with 
the diminished expectation of privacy that underscores the third-party doc-
trine because it  provides “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” 
information, giving the government “an intimate window into a person’s life, 
revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”37  The Court held 
                                                          
 30.  Andrew Perrin, 10 Facts About Cell Phones as the iPhone Turns 10, PEW RES. CTR. (June 
28, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/28/10-facts-about-smartphones/.  Sev-
enty-seven percent of adults in the United States own smartphones.  Id.  Of the number of people 
who own a smartphone, forty-six percent say they could not live without it.  Id.  Smartphones are 
on track to reach market saturation in a record-setting ten years.  Michael DeGusta, Are Smart 
Phones Spreading Faster Than Any Technology in Human History?, MIT TECH. REV. (May 9, 
2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/427787/are-smart-phones-spreading-faster-than-any-
technology-in-human-history/. 
 31.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
 32.  CSLI creates a record of where a cellular device is located whenever it is turned on and 
connected to a cellular network based on signals transmitted between a device and a cellular tower.  
Depending on the density of cell towers, this information can be as precise as or even more accurate 
than GPS information and can essentially “reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the 
minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.”  GRAY, supra note 22, at 26–
27 (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490). 
 33.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 34.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).  
 35.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13. 
 36.  Id. at 2219–20. 
 37.  Id. at 2216, 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring)). 
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that although CSLI was discoverable, it could not be obtained without a war-
rant supported by probable cause.38 
2.  The Search Incident to Arrest Exception—Riley v. California 
Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, no warrant or probable 
cause is required for law enforcement officers to search persons being ar-
rested and anything within the arrestee’s area of immediate control.39  This 
type of search has traditionally been justified by the government’s interest in 
ensuring law enforcement officers’ safety and preventing the destruction of 
evidence.40  The search incident to arrest doctrine has been used expansively 
to support the search of even innocuous-seeming possessions of an arrestee, 
including the contents of a crumpled cigarette box.41  However, in Riley v. 
California, the Supreme Court limited this doctrine from permitting the 
search of a cell phone without a warrant.42 
After being pulled over for an expired license plate, Riley was eventu-
ally arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms discovered 
when his car was impounded and inventoried.43  Incident to his arrest, police 
seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket and examined the contents, 
discovering text messages, pictures, and videos that indicated he was in-
volved with the “Bloods” street gang and connected him to a recent shoot-
ing.44  In a companion case, United States v. Wurie,45 officers seized a “flip 
phone”46 from Wurie after he was arrested for selling drugs on the street.47  
Officers used the call history and photographs on the phone to locate an apart-
ment, at which, after obtaining a search warrant, officers discovered more 
drugs and other evidence of significant drug trafficking.48  Riley and Wurie 
                                                          
 38.  Id. at 2221. 
 39.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
 40.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483–85 (2014) (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753–54).  
 41.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).  
 42.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485. 
 43.  Id. at 2480.  The search of Riley’s vehicle which led to the discovery of the firearms was 
not supported by a warrant or any particular suspicion.  Id.  It was justified by a recognized warrant 
exception for inventory searches.  Id.; see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per 
curiam) (upholding the search of arrestee’s impounded vehicle).   
 44.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81. 
 45.  United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 
S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 46.  Flip phones, a common type of mobile phone that is flipped open for use, popular before 
the development of smartphones, have fewer capabilities and store less data than a smartphone.  
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481.  Flip phones can store, among other data, photos, contact lists, and call 
history.  Id. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id. 
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argued that the searches of their cell phones without a warrant violated the 
Fourth Amendment.49 
The Court agreed, emphasizing that both the quantity and quality of in-
formation stored on cell phones significantly increased the privacy interests 
and expectations of individuals carrying them.50  The Court also remarked on 
the pervasiveness of cell phone use in terms of both the percentage of people 
using the devices regularly and the manner in which they are used to monitor 
and record nearly every aspect of a person’s day-to-day life.51 
In addition to finding that the individual privacy interests at stake in cell 
phone searches were higher than in searches of physical items, the Court also 
remarked that cell phone searches are not justified by the government con-
cerns that underlie the search incident to arrest exception52: Cell phone data 
poses no threat to the safety of officers and is not at risk of being destroyed 
as evidence once in the possession of law enforcement.53 
The Court rejected other rules proffered by the government to curtail 
arrestee cell phone searches without prohibiting them altogether.54  One of 
the Court’s concerns was how to distinguish between data stored on the actual 
device the individual was carrying and data readily retrieved from remote 
data centers.55  The government conceded that the search incident to arrest 
exception could not be stretched to search files stored on the cloud, since, in 
the Court’s analogy, that would be tantamount to finding a key on the indi-
vidual and being permitted to search the entire contents of his house.56  The 
Court also rejected the idea that police could search cell phone data that had 
a physical analog for two reasons.57  First, though the content may be equiv-
alent, it would be unlikely or impossible for an individual to carry all the 
                                                          
 49.  Id. at 2481–82. 
 50.  Id at 2489. 
 51.  Id. at 2490 (“[T]he phrase ‘there’s an app for that’ is now part of the popular lexicon.”).  
 52.  Id. at 2485–87. 
 53.  Id.  The Court found the argument that officers could intercept important communications 
for co-conspirators to prevent future harm did not justify the warrantless search.  Id. at 2486.  These 
types of circumstances, the Court reasoned, could better be dealt with under the doctrine of exigent 
circumstances.  Id.  The Court also was not persuaded by the government’s concerns about remote 
data wiping of devices and data encryption.  Id. at 2486–87. 
 54.  Id. at 2491. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id.  This distinction highlights another tension between doctrines for physical searches and 
the digital world.  For more discussion on the location-driven approach to digital information, see 
Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179, 186–91 (2018). 
 57.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493. 
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digital content on their cell phone in physical form.58  Second, the Court be-
lieved this rule would be too difficult for law enforcement officers and courts 
to apply.59 
B.  The Border Search Exception 
Like the third-party doctrine and the search incident to arrest exception, 
the border search exception is a historically recognized Fourth Amendment 
doctrine that allows the government to conduct an investigation without ob-
taining a warrant.60  A border search is a search of a person or property upon 
entering or departing the country.61  Border searches occur at the actual geo-
graphic boundary and at other points of entry, including international air-
ports.62  The Court’s protective treatment of cell phone data under other tra-
ditional warrant exceptions prompts questions about whether the border 
search exception should also be limited when applied to personal electronic 
devices.63 
This Section first describes Supreme Court precedent governing border 
searches.64  Next, this Section discusses current DHS policies on the execu-
tion of border searches of electronic devices and proposed legislation that 
would provide further limitations.65 
1.  Origins and Historical Justification of the Border Search 
Exception 
Historically, border searches have been deemed reasonable without a 
warrant because of the compelling government interest in controlling who 
and what may cross into the nation’s sovereign territory.66  The Constitution 
gives the federal government various specific powers that require oversight 
of what persons and property cross the border, including the power to “pro-
vide for the common defence,”67 “regulate commerce with foreign nations,”68 
                                                          
 58.  Id. (“It is implausible that [Riley] would have strolled around with video tapes, photo al-
bums, and an address book all crammed into his pockets.”). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004) (citing United States v. 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)). 
 61.  See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 137–38 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. 
Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296–97 (4th Cir. 1995)) (explaining that rationales underlying the border 
search exception extend equally to exit and entry searches).   
 62.  Id. at 137. 
 63.  See infra Part II. 
 64.  See infra Section I.B.1. 
 65.  See infra Section I.B.2–3. 
 66.  United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537–38 (1985) (citing United States 
v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618–19 (1977)).  
 67.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 68.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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and “establish an uniform rule of naturalization.”69  Throughout history, the 
government has relied on interdiction at the border to meet contemporary 
challenges to these objectives.70 
In its fifth act of legislation, the first Congress of the United States 
passed a law establishing the United States Customs Service on July 31, 
1789.71  The Customs Service was responsible for collecting tariffs on im-
ported goods critical to financing the new government at ports of entry on the 
international border.72  The law enabled customs officers “to open and exam-
ine” the items transported across the border and gave officers the “full power 
and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to 
suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; 
and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods.”73  While the law 
instructed customs officers to apply for a warrant to search a “dwelling-
house, store, building, or other place” suspected of concealing goods subject 
to a duty, no such warrant was required on ships or containers moving across 
the border.74 
The Fourth Amendment was officially ratified two years later on De-
cember 15, 1791, with the rest of the Bill of Rights.75  As was recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States,76 one of the oldest Supreme 
Court cases to recognize the border search exception, the temporal proximity 
of these acts shows that those who originally contemplated the Constitution’s 
prohibition of unreasonable searches recognized the difference in the balance 
of government and private interests between searches in the interior and at 
the border.77 
                                                          
 69.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 70.  During the period following the Revolutionary War, the United States relied on customs 
inspectors to ensure duties were properly paid on goods traded with other countries, which was 
important for establishing the United States in the interstate economy and raising revenue to pay the 
nation’s debts.  See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (discussing early customs 
revenue laws of the United States).  The government has also used border checkpoints to prevent 
contraband from entering the United States during the Prohibition era and later during the War on 
Drugs.  See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538 (discussing the role border searches may play 
in protecting the nation from “the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling 
of illicit narcotics”). 
 71.  Act of Jul. 31, 1789, Sess. I, ch. 5. 
 72.  Id § 22.  
 73.  Id. §§ 23–24. 
 74.  Id. § 24.  
 75.  U.S. CONST. amend. I–X. 
 76.  116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 77.  Id. at 623; see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–17 (1977) (“As this act was 
passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Consti-
tution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as 
‘unreasonable,’ and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.” (quoting Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886))). 
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The distinction between searches at the border and inside the United 
States was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States.78  
The Court stated that although it would be unreasonable for prohibition 
agents to stop every car lawfully using the highways “on the chance of find-
ing liquor,” all travelers could be stopped when “crossing an international 
boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one enter-
ing the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings 
as effects which may be lawfully brought in.”79 
Six years after President Nixon officially declared a “War on Drugs,”80 
the Supreme Court affirmed the importance and permissibility of warrantless 
border searches in United States v. Ramsey.81  The Court upheld the opening 
of mailed envelopes that were suspected of containing illegal drugs, without 
a warrant or probable cause, denying any difference between packages that 
were mailed and those that were carried by an individual across the border.82  
“It is their entry into this country from without it that makes a resulting search 
‘reasonable.’”83  The Court also emphasized that the “historically recog-
nized” border search exception is not based on the doctrine of exigent cir-
cumstances “at all,” but rather is a historical doctrine of independent justifi-
cation similar to the “search incident to lawful arrest” exception.84  Still, the 
Court noted that although most border searches were presumptively reason-
able without a warrant, a border search might be deemed “unreasonable” due 
to “the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out,” but declined 
to opine under what circumstances.85 
2.  Distinguishing Routine and Nonroutine Border Searches 
Eight years later, in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,86 the Court 
identified a search that was, as alluded to in Ramsey, conducted in such an 
offensive and intrusive manner that, unlike other routine border searches, it 
                                                          
 78.  267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 79.  Id. at 154. 
 80.  At a press conference on June 17, 1971, President Nixon called drug abuse “public enemy 
number one.”  Chris Barber, Public Enemy Number One: A Pragmatic Approach to America’s Drug 
Problem, RICHARD NIXON FOUND. (June 29, 2016), https://www.nixonfounda-
tion.org/2016/06/26404/.  Nixon described multi-faceted policy approach to “wage a new, all-out 
offensive” to “fight and defeat this enemy” which included increasing enforcement abroad and 
within the United States.  Id. 
 81.  431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).  
 82.  Id. at 620. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 621.  
 85.  Id. at 618 n.13. 
 86.  473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
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was unconstitutional without individualized suspicion.87  Montoya de Her-
nandez arrived at the Los Angeles International Airport on a flight from Bo-
gotá, Colombia.88  After questioning Montoya de Hernandez and conducting 
a pat down and strip search, customs agents suspected that she was smuggling 
drugs in her alimentary canal.89  Refusing to submit to an x-ray inspection, 
Montoya de Hernandez was detained in a customs office for observation until 
she produced a bowel movement.90  After several hours passed, customs of-
ficials obtained a court order authorizing a rectal examination and involun-
tary x-ray.91  A physician removed a balloon filled with cocaine from Mon-
toya de Hernandez’s body and Montoya de Hernandez was arrested.92 
The Court held that detention at the international border beyond “a rou-
tine customs search and inspection” is only permissible if customs agents 
“reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimen-
tary canal.”93  The Court explained that in Montoya de Hernandez’s case, the 
reasonable suspicion standard appropriately balanced the “private and public 
interests” at stake.94  Justice Brennan wrote a strong dissent joined by Justice 
Marshall arguing that even at the international border, the detention of Mon-
toya de Hernandez and other investigations that involved highly intrusive 
techniques, such as body-cavity searches, x-rays, and stomach-pumping, are 
barred by the Fourth Amendment without a warrant.95 
The Court declined to extend the reasonable suspicion requirement to a 
border search of a vehicle in United States v. Flores-Montano96 in which the 
                                                          
 87.  See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13 (discussing the possibility that a border search could at 
some point become “unreasonable”). 
 88.  Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533. 
 89.  Id.  Their suspicion was based on answers to questioning about her travel plans, recent 
travel history, the “firm fullness” of her abdomen, and multiple pairs of underpants discovered dur-
ing the strip search.  Id. at 533–34. 
 90.  Id. at 534–35. 
 91.  Id. at 535.  At this point, Montoya de Hernandez had been in custody for almost twenty-
four hours.  Id. 
 92.  Id.  Over the next four days she passed eighty-eight balloons filled with a total of 528 grams 
of eight percent pure cocaine hydrochloride.  Id. at 536. 
 93.  Id. at 541. 
 94.  Id.  The government interest was high considering not only the “longstanding concern for 
the protection of the integrity of the border,” but also the “veritable national crisis in law enforce-
ment caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics.”  Id. at 538.  Additionally, the Court recognized that 
an alimentary canal smuggler generally “gives no external signs” and would rarely give rise to a 
probable cause standard.  Id. at 541.  Although the Court did not articulate specifically what aspects 
of the search made it “beyond the scope of a routine customs search,” the length of time of the 
detention and humiliation suffered by Montoya de Hernandez while being monitored for a bowel 
movement made the search distinctly offensive.  Id.  Ultimately, the search was deemed lawful 
because the Court determined that customs officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion at the 
time of the search.  Id. at 542. 
 95.  Id. at 551–52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 96.  541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
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vehicle’s gas tank was completely disassembled by customs officers.97  The 
Court upheld the search, which yielded illicit drugs, denying that the vehicle 
owner had any privacy interest in his gas tank.98  The Court also found that 
no damage was done to the fuel tank or vehicle during the search, and, there-
fore, declined to opine on whether or to what extent property may be dam-
aged in a suspicionless border search.99 
Aside from the alimentary canal search in Montoya de Hernandez, the 
Supreme Court has never required any particularized suspicion to justify a 
search at the border.100  However, several federal courts of appeals have re-
quired a reasonable suspicion standard for other searches deemed “nonrou-
tine.”101  These types of searches include strip searches,102 x-ray searches,103 
searches requiring the removal of an artificial limb,104 the drilling of perma-
nent holes into property,105 and an extensive search of a laptop computer.106 
3.  Current Homeland Security Policies and Proposed Legislation 
While customs inspections at the border are still critical for collecting 
duties and facilitating international trade, today CBP also conducts opera-
tions focused on combating international drug trafficking, terrorism, and il-
legal immigration.107  According to CBP, the agency apprehends more than 
1100 individuals for suspected crimes and seizes nearly four tons of illicit 
drugs a day.108 
                                                          
 97.  Id. at 151.  
 98.  Id. at 154.  
 99.  Id.  The Court did not affirm or deny the reasoning of the multiple circuit courts that re-
quired reasonable suspicion to drill holes, causing permanent damage, to vehicles or other contain-
ers crossing the border.  Id. at 154 n.2.  The Court also “le[ft] open the question ‘whether, and under 
what circumstances, a border search [of property] might be deemed ‘unreasonable.’”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977)). 
 100.  United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018).  But see Ramsey, 431 U.S. 
at 625 (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of the effect of federal statutes which 
required “reasonable cause to suspect” contraband was present to conduct a search in protecting 
individual Fourth Amendment rights (citing 19 U.S.C. § 482)).   
 101.  See supra notes 102–106 and accompanying text. 
 102.  United States v. Uricoechea-Casallas, 946 F.2d 162, 166 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 103.  United States v. Vega-Bravo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 104.  United States v. Sanders, 663 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 105.  United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 
1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1989).  
 106.  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 107.  See About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/about (last 
modified Nov. 21, 2016) (explaining that CBP “is charged with keeping terrorists and their weapons 
out of the U.S.” in addition to “facilitating lawful international travel and trade”).  CBP’s mission 
is to “safeguard America’s borders thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and mate-
rials while enhancing the Nation’s global economic competitiveness by enabling legitimate trade 
and travel.”  Id.   
 108.  Id. 
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In recent years, CBP has increased its execution of cell phone and com-
puter searches.109  During the first six months of fiscal year 2017, CBP 
searched the electronic devices of 14,993 travelers coming into the United 
States.110  Although this only represents a very small fraction of arriving in-
dividuals, it is a rate that is four times higher than it was in 2015.111  CBP 
defends its increased use of digital searches as necessary to meet their “mis-
sion to protect the American people and enforce the nation’s laws in this dig-
ital age.”112  Border searches of electronic devices have resulted in evidence 
to “combat[] terrorist activity, child pornography, violations of export con-
trols, intellectual property rights violations, and visa fraud.”113 
In 2018, U.S. Congressional Representatives and Senators proposed 
legislation “to place restrictions on searches and seizures of electronic de-
vices at the border”114 that proscribes standards for how DHS personnel 
should conduct inspections of electronic devices entering or exiting the coun-
try to balance the important government and private interests at stake. 
a.  Current DHS Electronic Device Search Policies 
In January 2018, CBP updated their official policy on how and when 
officers should inspect electronic devices at the border.115  According to the 
policy, the extent of the search may be limited based on whether it is defined 
as a “basic search” or an “advanced search.”116  An advanced search is de-
fined by CBP as “any search in which an Officer connects external equip-
ment . . . to an electronic device . . . to review, copy, and/or analyze its con-
tents.”117  Basic searches are defined as those that are “not an advanced 
search.”118 
                                                          
 109.  CBP Releases Statistics, supra note 3; see also Kaveh Waddell, The Steady Rise of Digital 
Border Searches, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ar-
chive/2017/04/the-steady-rise-of-digital-border-searches/522723/. 
 110.  This number represents .008% of all arrivals.  CBP Releases Statistics, supra note 3.  
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id. 
 114.  S. 2462, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 115.  U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, (Jan. 4, 
2018), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-Jan/CBP-Directive-3340-
049A-Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media-Compliant.pdf [hereinafter CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-
049A].  Electronic devices are defined broadly as “[a]ny device that may contain information in an 
electronic or digital form, such as computers, tablets, disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones and other 
communication devices, cameras, music and other media players.”  Id. ¶ 3.2.  This new policy in-
cludes significant updates from the previous 2009 policy.  See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 
PROTECTION, CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049 (Aug. 20, 2009), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/as-
sets/cbp_directive_3340-049.pdf. 
 116.  CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 115, ¶¶ 5.1.3–.4.  
 117.  Id. ¶ 5.1.4. 
 118.  Id. ¶ 5.1.3. 
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The policy references case law supporting the proposition that border 
searches are “not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, proba-
ble cause, or warrant.”119  However, though a basic search may be conducted 
“with or without suspicion,”120 the policy states that an advanced search may 
be performed when there is “reasonable suspicion of activity in violation of 
the laws enforced or administered by CBP, or in which there is a national 
security concern.”121 
The policy sanctions physical inspection of an electronic device and ex-
amination of information stored on the device itself, but specifically prohib-
its, in all instances, the intentional access of information stored remotely.122  
The policy also instructs CBP officers to request assistance from travelers in 
unlocking passcode-protected or encrypted data.123  If a traveler refuses to 
unlock the device or the inspection cannot otherwise be completed, the of-
ficer may detain the device.124 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has not released an up-
dated electronic device border search policy since August 2009.125  Unlike 
the new CBP policy, the ICE policy does not distinguish between “advanced” 
and “basic” searches.126  The ICE policy maintains that ICE agents “may 
search, detain, seize, retain, and share electronic devices, or information con-
tained therein, with or without individualized suspicion.”127  The policy also 
does not distinguish between information discovered on the device and in-
formation obtained via the device from other remote storage locations.128 
                                                          
 119.  Id. ¶ 4 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)). 
 120.  Id. ¶ 5.1.3.  
 121.  Id. ¶ 5.1.4. 
 122.  Id. ¶ 5.1.2.  To facilitate this objective, the policy encourages officers to request that the 
traveler disable network connectivity by placing the device in airplane mode or by other means.  Id. 
 123.  Id. ¶ 5.3.1. 
 124.  Id. ¶ 5.3.3.  Scholars have questioned whether forcing individuals to give up passwords to 
unlock protected files contravenes the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.  For 
discussion of potential Fifth Amendment concerns with this practice see, for example, Lauren Sa-
charoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 
203 (2018).  The CBP policy also states that electronic devices or copies of information gathered 
from devices may only be retained after an inspection if there is probable cause that it “contains 
evidence of a violation of law that CBP is authorized to enforce or administer” or is “information 
relating to immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters.”  CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-
049A, supra note 115, ¶¶ 5.5.1.1–.3.  All other electronic records will be “destroyed” within seven 
days of such a determination, and the electronic device will be returned.  Id. ¶ 5.4.1.2.  However, if 
more time is required by the “circumstances” a supervisor may approve the retention of information 
up to twenty-one days.  Id. 
 125.  U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DIRECTIVE NO. 7-6.1 (Aug. 18, 2009), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf.  
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. ¶ 6.1.  
 128.  Id. ¶ 5.1. 
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b.  Proposed Legislation 
On February 27, 2018, Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Steve Dains 
(R-MT) introduced Senate Bill 2462—“a bill [t]o place restrictions on 
searches and seizures of electronic devices at the border.”129  The bill requires 
individualized suspicion for all electronic device searches,130 and places other 
limitations on current DHS policies.131 
Senate Bill 2462 distinguishes between “manual” and “forensic” 
searches of digital devices.132  Forensic searches are any searches that take 
longer than four hours, involve “copying or documentation of data stored on 
the device,” or are conducted with the assistance of other electronic devices 
or passwords. 133  Manual searches are those conducted without “assistance 
of any other electronic device, electronic equipment, or software” or “the en-
try of any password, passcode, fingerprint, account information, or other bi-
ometric identifier” that gives access to protected data.134   
Under the proposed legislation, manual searches would generally only 
be permitted if a homeland security officer had “reasonable suspicion” that 
an individual is either carrying contraband or is not legally permitted to enter 
the United States.135  Seizure of electronic devices and “forensic searches” 
would only be permitted if an officer has probable cause that the person is 
carrying contraband, not legally admissible to the United States, or violating 
any law punishable by more than one year “and the electronic device contains 
information or evidence relevant” to the violation.136  Forensic searches 
would only be permitted after obtaining a warrant by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.137 
                                                          
 129.  S. 2462, 115th Cong. (2018).  
 130.  During the previous legislative session, a more restrictive bill entitled “The Protecting Data 
at the Border Act” was introduced in both chambers of Congress.  H.R. 1899, 115th Cong. (2017); 
S. 823, 115th Cong. (2017).  The Act would prevent seizing, copying, or retaining any electronic 
device or information obtained from them without a warrant or probable cause that they contained 
evidence of a felony.  H.R. 1899 § 5(a)(1).  The bills were referred to the House Subcommittee on 
Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigation and the Senate Subcommittee on Federal 
Spending Oversight Management, but never advanced to the House or Senate floor.  
 131.  S. 2462 § 1(2). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. § 1(1).  
 134.  Id. § 1. 
 135.  Id. § 2(b). 
 136.  Id. § 2(c)(2). 
 137.  Id. § 2(d).  The bill also includes various provisions which require the Department of 
Homeland Security to record and report several statistics regarding the number of searches and 
demographics of travelers whose electronic devices were searched, and the number of those 
searched who were later charged with a criminal offense based on information obtained by the bor-
der search.  Id. § 3. 
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The bill was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs which held a hearing on the issue on July 11, 2018, but has 
not been brought to the Senate floor. 
C.  Border Search Circuit Split 
In opinions issued two weeks apart, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits came to conflicting conclusions after 
considering what, if any, level of suspicion is required for law enforcement 
officers to conduct forensic searches of digital devices traveling across the 
international border.138  Although courts have contemplated this issue be-
fore,139 these cases are the first circuit courts of appeals to decide the issue 
following the Supreme Court’s ruling on smartphone searches in Riley v. Cal-
ifornia.140  The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,141 Seventh,142 
Ninth,143 and Tenth144 Circuits also received direct challenges to cell phone 
searches at the border in 2018 but have not reached definitive rulings on the 
question.145  Lower courts in several circuits have continued to grapple with 
the question as well.146 
                                                          
 138.  See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding reasonable suspicion 
was required to conduct a forensic search of a cell phone at the border); United States v. Touset, 
890 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding no level of individualized suspicion is required to 
conduct a forensic search of electronic devices at the border). 
 139.  See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 968 (2013) (en banc) (holding a foren-
sic examination of the defendant’s computer required a showing of reasonable suspicion). 
 140.  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
 141.  United States v. Molina-Isadoro, 884 F.3d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2018) (choosing not to decide 
how the border search exception is affected by Riley because the non-forensic border search of the 
defendant’s cell phone was supported by probable cause). 
 142.  United States v. Wanjiku, No. 16 CR 296, 2017 WL 1304087, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2017), 
argued, No. 18-1973 (7th Cir. Nov. 7, 2018). 
 143.  United States v. Cano, 222 F. Supp. 3d 876, 882–83 (S.D. Cal. 2016), appeal docketed, 
No. 17-50151 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2017). 
 144.  United States v. Williams, No. 16-CR-249 (D. Colo.), appeal docketed, No. 18-1299 (10th 
Cir. July 27, 2018). 
 145.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to suppress evidence from a warrantless 
search of an international traveler’s cell phone under the good faith exception.  Molina-Isadoro, 884 
F.3d at 289.  The court, however, expressly avoided reaching the question of what level of suspicion 
is required for cell phone searches at the border, instead determining that because CBP agents had 
probable cause and only conducted a manual search of the defendant’s phone, they acted reasonably 
in light of existing law.  Id. at 290.   
 146.  E.g., Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL2179323, at *1 (D. Mass. May 
9, 2018); United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1011 (S.D. Cal. 2016); United States v. 
Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 34 (D. D.C. 2015), appeal dismissed, No. 15-3035, 2015 WL 5237696 
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 14, 2015).  The same week that the Eleventh Circuit split from the Fourth Circuit, 
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied a motion to dismiss a civil 
case seeking a declaratory judgment that the current CBP and ICE policies for electronic device 
searches violate the Fourth Amendment, departing from a previous ruling on a similar challenge 
decided six years prior.  Alasaad, 2018 WL2179323, at *14. 
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1.  The Eleventh Circuit View: No Particularized Suspicion is 
Required to Search an Electronic Device at the Border 
According to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, only a par-
ticularly intrusive search of a person can be considered a nonroutine border 
search that requires reasonable suspicion;147 border searches of property, in-
cluding extensive searches of cell phone data, do not require any level of 
particularized suspicion.148  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this view in two 
separate cases in 2018, United States v. Vergara149 and United States v. 
Touset.150 
First, in Vergara, the Eleventh Circuit held that a forensic search of a 
cell phone at the border was reasonable without a warrant or probable 
cause.151  Vergara, a U.S. citizen, was returning to Florida from an interna-
tional cruise when he was singled out by CBP for additional screening.152  A 
lookout notice had been attached to his name based on a previous conviction 
for possession of child pornography.153  CBP agents began manually looking 
through the pictures and videos on a cell phone in his luggage.154  After find-
ing a questionable video, a homeland security agent decided to forensically 
search all three cell phones he was carrying.155  The searches revealed more 
than 100 videos and images of child pornography.156  Vergara was charged 
with transporting and possessing child pornography.157  The United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Vergara’s motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained from his cell phone, rejecting his argument 
that based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California, any search 
of a cell phone is beyond the reach of the border exception and, therefore, a 
warrant supported by probable cause is required.158 
In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed the district court ruling 
and determined that “[b]order searches ‘never’ require probable cause or a 
                                                          
 147.  United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1231–34 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 148.  Id. at 1234.  
 149.  884 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 70 (2018). 
 150.  890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018).   
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id.  A lookout is a notice recorded in the TECS System: Primary and Secondary Processing 
(“TECS”) information sharing platform used by DHS that notifies other users that agents should 
conduct additional screening of an individual.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TECS SYSTEM: 
PLATFORM 2 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS-PIA-ALL-
021%20TECS%20System%20Platform.pdf. 
 154.  Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1313 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 155.  Id. at 1311 (majority opinion). 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 1312. 
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warrant.”159  Some “highly intrusive” border searches “of a person’s body 
such as a strip search or an x-ray examination” require reasonable suspicion, 
but, the court pointed out, this was a search of property not a person.160  The 
court determined that Riley’s warrant requirement for cell phones was limited 
to searches conducted pursuant to a search incident to arrest and did not apply 
to a border search.161 
In dissent, Judge Jill Pryor concluded that a forensic search of a cell 
phone at the border requires a warrant supported by probable cause.162  Alt-
hough Judge Pryor recognized that the Government’s interest at the border is 
“at its zenith,” she found that the privacy interests in a forensic cell phone 
search required additional protections.163  She noted the Supreme Court’s 
strong language about the nature of data contained on cell phones in Riley 
and pointed out that “the privacy interests implicated in forensic searches are 
even greater than those involved in the manual searches at issue in Riley.”164  
She also reasoned that the purpose of the border exception was to prevent 
“physical contraband . . . communicable diseases, narcotics, or explosives” 
from crossing the border, which are not found in cellphone data.165  In con-
trast, she questioned whether the government’s electronic border searches are 
necessary or effective means of intercepting digital evidence since “elec-
tronic contraband is borderless” and need not be physically moved through a 
border checkpoint to enter the country.166 
Two months after issuing their decision in Vergara, the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed its majority position in United States v. Touset.167  The court explic-
itly recognized its disagreement with an intervening opinion issued by the 
Fourth Circuit168 and reaffirmed its holding that no level of individualized 
suspicion is required for a search of electronic devices under the border 
search exception.169 
Like Vergara, Karl Touset, a U.S. citizen, was returning home from a 
trip to Mexico when he arrived at the Atlanta International Airport.170  Prior 
to his travels, DHS placed a lookout on Touset based on information obtained 
                                                          
 159.  Id. (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977)). 
 160.  Id. (quoting United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 729 (11th Cir. 2010)). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. at 1318–19 (Pryor, J., dissenting).  
 163.  Id. at 1314 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)). 
 164.  Id. at 1315 (alteration in original).  
 165.  Id. at 1317. 
 166.  Id.  
 167.  890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 168.  See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 127, 146 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding a forensic search 
of a cell phone is a nonroutine border search that requires at least reasonable suspicion). 
 169.  Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234.  
 170.  Id. at 1230. 
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from a preliminary Cyber Crime Center investigation that suggested he was 
involved with child pornography and sexual exploitation of children.171  A 
CBP officer inspecting Touset’s luggage obtained his two laptops, two exter-
nal hard drives, and two tablets.172  Based largely on DHS’s lookout, CBP 
conducted a forensic analysis of the devices, which took seventeen days and 
revealed child pornography.173  Based on the illicit files obtained from the 
forensic search of Touset’s devices, DHS agents obtained a warrant to search 
Touset’s home, which revealed further evidence that he had purchased child 
pornography from the Philippines.174 
After being indicted on multiple counts of receiving, transporting and 
shipping, and possessing child pornography, Touset filed a motion to sup-
press the evidence obtained from the search of his electronic devices at the 
border, as well as the fruit of those searches, arguing that CBP did not have 
the appropriate level of suspicion to lawfully conduct the search.175  The 
United States District Court for the District of Georgia denied Touset’s mo-
tion.176  Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cotter-
man,177 the court held that reasonable suspicion was required for a forensic 
border search of an electronic device but found that CBP had reasonable sus-
picion when they detained and conducted the forensic search of Touset’s lap-
tops and hard drives.178 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment that the evi-
dence should not be suppressed but disagreed with the determination that an 
elevated level of individualized suspicion was required to conduct a forensic 
search of an electronic device at the border.179  The court again stressed that 
Riley’s treatment of cell phone searches does not apply to border searches but 
is only required to balance the interests at stake in searches incident to an 
arrest.180 
                                                          
 171.  Id.  Xoom, a money transferring company, identified Touset and other customers it sus-
pected were involved in child pornography based on their history of frequent low money transfers 
to source countries for sex tourism and child pornography and reported their suspicion to the Na-
tional Center for Missing and Exploited Children.  Id.  Yahoo also reported tips to the Center based 
on their own investigation of personal email accounts.  Id.  With this information, the Cyber Crime 
Center of DHS began its own investigation and was able to link Touset to a suspected supplier of 
child pornography in the Philippines.  Id.  
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id.  Nothing in the opinion suggests the child pornography in his possession was obtained 
during or was related to his recent trip to Mexico. 
 175.  Id. at 1231. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 178.  Touset, 890 F.3d at 1231.  
 179.  Id. at 1234. 
 180.  Id. 
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The court further emphasized a distinction between searches of persons 
and of property in the Supreme Court’s decisions on border searches.181  
Based on Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court noted that the most important 
factors that determine whether someone’s personal dignity was excessively 
degraded by a border search include “(1) physical contact between the 
searcher and the person searched; (2) exposure of intimate body parts; and 
(3) use of force.”182  Unlike strip searches or even x-ray searches, the search 
of someone’s cell phone or laptop would not implicate these concerns.183 
Finally, the court indicated its preference for Congress to regulate the 
limitations of border searches, not the courts.184  The court stated that Con-
gress would be better equipped than the courts “to design the appropriate 
standard ‘through the more adaptable legislative process and the wider lens 
of legislative hearings.’”185 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Corrigan stated that he would reach the 
court’s judgement on the narrower grounds that CBP had reasonable suspi-
cion when they conducted the search.186  Judge Corrigan would avoid reach-
ing the “different and difficult question” of whether border agents need jus-
tification at all to detain and forensically analyze electronic devices before 
the Supreme Court has opined on the matter.187 
2.  The Fourth Circuit View: At Least Reasonable Suspicion Is 
Required to Forensically Search an Electronic Device at the 
Border 
Unlike the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit recognized a clear distinction between a forensic 
search of the contents of a cell phone and a search of other physical property 
                                                          
 181.  Id. at 1233–34.  The only case where the Supreme Court required reasonable suspicion for 
a border search was based on the extended detention of a person.  See United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (requiring reasonable suspicion to detain a woman for nearly 
an entire day to compel her to pass contraband from her alimentary canal).  Based on Flores-Mon-
tano, the court concluded that even invasive or lengthy searches of property did not implicate a need 
for heightened suspicion.  Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233; see United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 
149, 155 (2004) (upholding the disassembly of a vehicle’s fuel tank to search for contraband without 
suspicion). 
 182.  Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (quoting United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346 (11th 
Cir. 1984)).  
 183.  Id.  In the alternative, the court determined that if reasonable suspicion was required to 
search Touset’s electronic devices at the border, reasonable suspicion existed at the time of the 
search.  Id. at 1237–38. 
 184.  Id. at 1236.  
 185.  Id. at 1237 (quoting United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 150 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, 
J., concurring)). 
 186.  Id. at 1238–39 (Corrigan, J., concurring).  
 187.  Id. 
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carried across the international border.188  In United States v. Kolsuz189 the 
Fourth Circuit announced that forensic searches of cell phones at the border 
require at least reasonable suspicion, if not more;190 a manual search, how-
ever, is a routine border search that requires no individualized suspicion.191  
This position mirrors the Ninth Circuit’s stance regarding laptop searches at 
the border, which predated Riley, and decisions in other circuits that have 
required reasonable suspicion for border searches that involve more thorough 
inspections of property.192 
On February 2, 2016, Hamza Kolsuz, a Turkish citizen, attempted to 
board a plane at Washington Dulles International Airport bound for Istanbul, 
Turkey, when CBP agents stopped him on the jetway.193  CBP agents had 
found various firearms parts in his checked luggage, some of which are ille-
gal to remove from the United States without a specific export license.194  
After Kolsuz admitted he was in possession of firearms parts without a fed-
eral firearms license, CBP transported Kolsuz and his belongings to a sec-
ondary inspection area at the airport where a CBP officer conducted a manual 
inspection of Kolsuz’s iPhone by navigating the unlocked phone’s touch 
                                                          
 188.  United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 189.  890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 190.  Id. at 144. 
 191.  Id. at 142.  In Kolsuz, the court also clarified that when an individual is arrested at a border 
crossing, a search of their person and possessions are still governed by the border search exception 
and need not adhere to stricter guidelines governing the search incident to arrest exception.  Id.  This 
varies from the presentation in Vergara and Touset because in those cases, the defendant was ar-
rested based on digital evidence found on their electronic devices.  See supra notes 151–157 and 
accompanying text.  Kolsuz could have been arrested based on the physical contraband initially 
discovered in his suitcase alone before officers searched his phone.  See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 847–
48 (stating officers immediately knew that the items found in Kolsuz’s luggage could not be taken 
out of the country without a proper license, and Kolsuz admitted he did not have a license before 
being asked to hand over his cell phone).  
 192.  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 899 (2014).  Additionally, though the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit did not issue an opinion in the case, the court dismissed an appeal from the District 
Court for the District of Columbia that also held at least reasonable suspicion was required for a 
forensic cell phone search, indicating their likely adherence to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ posi-
tion.  United States v. Kim, No. 150-3035, 2015 WL 5237696 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 14, 2015), dismissing 
appeal from, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 34 (D.D.C. 2015).  Additionally, though the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not ruled on what level of suspicion is required for a forensic 
search of a cell phone or laptop at the border, in a decision concerning the reasonableness of a border 
search in which agents copied and read the entire contents of a travelers handwritten journal, the 
court indicated that this careful reading and copying, in contrast to merely skimming or opening the 
notebook, could be construed as a nonroutine border search that would require reasonable suspicion.  
United States v. Levy, 803 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2015).  This careful reading distinction is analo-
gous to a forensic search of a laptop.  Id. (citing United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th 
Cir. 2008)).  Therefore, it is likely that the Second Circuit would also determine that reasonable 
suspicion is required for a forensic search of an electronic device at the border. 
 193.  United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 847 (E.D. Va. 2016), aff’d, 890 F.3d 133 
(4th Cir. 2018). 
 194.  Id. at 847–48. 
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screen to view recent text messages and phone calls.195  After further inves-
tigation and questioning, CBP arrested Kolsuz and seized many of his be-
longings, including his smartphone.196 
CBP agents forensically searched the entire digital contents of Kolsuz’s 
smartphone. The search took one month and generated an 896-page report 
that included Kolsuz’s personal contacts list, photographs, emails, videos, 
conversations from messaging applications, calendar information, web 
browsing history, call logs, and a history of the phone’s precise GPS coordi-
nates.197 
The district court denied Kolsuz’s motion to suppress evidence obtained 
from the forensic search of his phone, rejecting his argument that based on 
Riley,198 the search required a warrant supported by probable cause.199  The 
district court determined that the forensic cell phone search was a nonroutine 
border search, but only required reasonable suspicion.200  Because the CBP 
officers had reasonable suspicion, the search was upheld.201 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s judgement, denying 
the suppression of evidence from the border search of Kolsuz’s phone.202  
The court also agreed with the district court that a forensic search of a cell-
phone at the border is a nonroutine border search, permissible only upon a 
showing of individualized suspicion.203  The court reasoned that the quantity 
of data stored on a smartphone, the sensitive nature of the information, and 
the fact that a traveler cannot reasonably mitigate the intrusion made the 
search significantly more invasive than a routine border search.204  The court 
likened the forensic search of a smartphone to other highly intrusive border 
searches, such as strip searches, alimentary-canal searches, and x-rays, that 
other courts have held require reasonable suspicion.205  The court noted that 
these conclusions were consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley, 
which limited the search incident to arrest exception’s application to cell 
phones.206 
                                                          
 195.  Id. at 848. 
 196.  Id. at 849. 
 197.  Id. at 849–50. 
 198.  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
 199.  Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 858. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. at 860. 
 202.  United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 148 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 203.  Id. at 146.  Because Kolsuz did not challenge the manual search of his phone, the court did 
not consider whether any individual suspicion was required for a manual search.  Id. at 146 n.5. 
 204.  Id. at 144–45. 
 205.  Id. at 144. 
 206.  Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145–46. 
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The court did not conclude whether reasonable suspicion, or something 
more, was enough to justify the forensic cell phone search.207  Instead, the 
court affirmed the district court’s decision to admit evidence from the foren-
sic search based on the good faith exception, finding that there was reasona-
ble suspicion for the search in this case, and even if more was required, CBP 
officers reasonably relied on established precedent allowing warrantless bor-
der searches of digital devices based on reasonable suspicion.208 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Wilkinson agreed with the majority’s 
holding that the search was permissible but lamented the majority’s willing-
ness to declare the forensic search of a smartphone a “nonroutine” border 
search instead of reaching the same holding on more limited grounds.209  
Judge Wilkinson stressed the important role the executive and legislative 
branches should play in determining the limits of the government’s power in 
protecting the border.210  He reasoned that those branches would have the 
knowledge and information available to better weigh the privacy and security 
interests at stake.211  Judge Wilkinson also found that the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Riley was distinguishable from the border exception and the same 
analysis did not apply.212 
3.  Other Pending Challenges 
Growing privacy concerns surrounding cell phones and other personal 
electronic devices have spurred ongoing challenges in other jurisdictions.213  
Although no other circuit court has issued an opinion determining the appli-
cation of the border search exception to cell phones, several appeals present-
ing this issue are pending while other cases are making their way through the 
trial courts.214  One case, in the United States District Court for the District 
                                                          
 207.  Id. at 148. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. at 148 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. at 153. 
 212.  Id. at 152. 
 213.  E.g., United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2018) (declining to decide 
whether cell phones are outside the scope of the border search exception but allowing a cell phone 
search under the good faith exception); United States v. Unpradit, No. 17-107(4), 2018 WL 
3377177, at *3 (D. Minn. July 11, 2018) (holding a manual search of a cell phone was a routine 
border search); United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (stating the 
court would apply Riley to cell phone searches at the border if it was not bound by Ninth Circuit 
precedent, permitting warrantless search based on reasonable suspicion); United States v. Feiten, 
No. 15–20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016) (holding Riley’s warrant require-
ment for cell phone searches did not apply to border searches). 
 214.  United States v. Wanjiku, No. 16 CR 296, 2017 WL 1304087 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2017), 
argued, No. 18-1973 (7th Cir. Nov. 7, 2018); United States v. Cano, 222 F. Supp. 3d 876 (S.D. Cal. 
2016), appeal docketed, No. 17-50151 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2017); United States v. Williams, No. 16-
CR-249 (D. Colo.), appeal docketed, No. 18-1299 (10th Cir. July 27, 2018). 
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of Massachusetts, seeking a declaration that DHS’s electronic device policies 
are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, illustrates a shifting attitude to-
wards more protections for smartphones.215 
On September 13, 2017, ten United States citizens and one lawful per-
manent resident filed an amended complaint in the Federal District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts alleging the search and seizure of their 
smartphones, laptops, and other electronic devices at the border violated the 
Fourth Amendment.216  All of the plaintiffs were subject to extensive 
searches of their personal electronic devices and none has been charged with 
any criminal offense.217  The lawsuit, naming Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity Kirstjen Nielson, Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Pro-
tection Kevin McAleenan, and Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement Thomas Homan, in their official capacity as defendants, 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief from the agency policies on elec-
tronic device searches.218  The plaintiffs asked the court to declare the poli-
cies unconstitutional and to enjoin the defendants from continuing to operate 
in accordance with them.219 
On May 9, 2018, the district court denied the defendants’ motion to dis-
miss the case for failure to state a claim.220  Six years earlier, the same court 
and judge dismissed a similar challenge to a suspicionless search of an elec-
tronic device at the international border.221  This time, however, the court 
                                                          
 215.  Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *1 (D. Mass. May 9, 
2018). 
 216.  Id. at *1.  The plaintiffs also allege the searches and seizures violated the First Amendment.  
Id.  Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the American 
Civil Liberties Union Foundation, and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Massa-
chusetts.  Id.  The plaintiffs come from various backgrounds—among them one is a NASA engineer, 
one is a graduate journalism student, another an independent filmmaker, and another a former Air 
Force captain.  Id. at *5–9.  The plaintiffs include Ghassan Alasaad, Nadia Alasaad, Shuhaib Allab-
abidi, Sidd Bikkannavar, Jérémie Dupin, Aaron Gach, Ismail Abdel-Rasoul, Diane Maye, Zainab 
Merchant, Mohammed Akram Shibly, and Matthew Wright. Id. at *1. 
 217.  Id. at *5–9. 
 218.  Id. at *1.  The plaintiffs request these law enforcement agencies be enjoined from contin-
uing to operate under their current policies, a declaration that the policies violate the Fourth and 
First Amendments and that the individual plaintiff’s rights were violated, and that the government 
return the device of one plaintiff and expunge all information gathered from the plaintiffs’ electronic 
devices and the social media information and device passwords provided.  Id. at *9, *11.  
 219.  Id. at *1. 
 220.  Id. at *24. 
 221.  See House v. Napolitano, No. 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816, at *8 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 
2012) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his 
electronic devices were searched at the border).  The court still allowed the case to proceed on other 
grounds.  Id.  Ultimately, House reached a settlement with the Government in May 2013 in which 
the Government agreed to release documents compiled throughout their investigation of House in 
exchange for him to withdraw his claim.  House v. Napolitano, ACLU (Sep. 9, 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/cases/house-v-napolitano?redirect=free-speech/house-v-napolitano. 
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took notice of the Supreme Court’s Riley decision and concluded that alt-
hough the border exception presents notably different government interests 
than the search incident to arrest exception,222 the court’s analysis of the pri-
vacy interest at stake in smartphones in Riley, may impact the analysis of the 
border search exception enough to state a claim and allow the lawsuit to pro-
ceed.223 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Judges and policymakers alike have contemplated to what extent digital 
property should be treated differently from physical objects being transported 
across the international border.224  In January 2018, the CBP issued an up-
dated policy providing new guidance for how CBP personnel should carry 
out searches of electronic devices.225  Weeks later, lawmakers introduced a 
bill in the Senate to place additional restrictions on border searches.226  
Within months, the Fifth,227 Fourth,228 and Eleventh circuits229 all ruled on 
cases challenging the constitutionality of electronic device searches at the 
border.230  Similar challenges are still pending in other circuits.231  Each of 
these decisions articulated a different standard for when and how these 
searches should take place.  As a result, travelers and law enforcement offic-
ers alike are faced with conflicting guidance and expectations.  Still, all these 
events suggest that electronic devices pose different concerns than other 
property inspected at border crossings. 
                                                          
 222.  See Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL2179323, at *19 (D. Mass. May 
9, 2018) (noting that digital contraband “falls within the ambit of the border search exception’s 
rationales”). 
 223.  Id. at *20.  
 224.  See supra Part I.  
 225.  See supra Section I.B.3.a. 
 226.  See supra Section I.B.3.c. 
 227.  United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2018) (upholding a cell phone 
search because agents had probable cause and even if a warrant was required, their actions would 
be covered by the good faith exception).   
 228.  United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018) (upholding a cell phone and laptop 
search because agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct a nonroutine search and if more was 
required their actions would be covered by the good faith exception). 
 229.  United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018) (upholding a search of several 
electronic devices because no level of individual suspicion is required for a border search, and, in 
the alternative, agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search).  
 230.  See supra Section I.C. 
 231.  E.g., United States v. Wanjiku, No. 16 CR 296, 2017 WL 1304087 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2017), 
argued, No. 18-1973 (7th Cir. Nov. 7, 2018); United States v. Aigbekaen, appeal docketed, No. 17-
4109 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2017); Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL2179323, at *1 
(D. Mass. May 9, 2018). 
 588 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:563 
This Part will first analyze the privacy interest that individuals crossing 
the border have in their cell phones and other digital devices.232 Next, this 
Part will analyze what government interest is served by the border search 
exception and, subsequently, whether searching digital devices at the border 
serves this interest.233  Finally, this Part will ask whether establishing tiers of 
intrusiveness for digital searches at the border, as recommended by various 
courts, executive agencies, and members of Congress, appeases Fourth 
Amendment concerns and can be practically implemented.234 
A.  The Privacy Interest in the Data on Digital Devices Greatly 
Exceeds That Originally Contemplated in the Border Search 
Exception 
Although the expectation of privacy may be diminished at a border 
crossing,235  travelers’ privacy interests in their cell phone data remains sig-
nificantly higher than in other types of property traditionally searched with-
out suspicion at the border.  The Supreme Court has recognized that ubiqui-
tous use of smartphones has increased the potential intrusiveness of 
government investigations that traditionally were conducted without a war-
rant.236  The concerns articulated by the Court in these cases similarly arise 
here. 
1.  Digital Property Stored on Electronic Devices Raise Different 
Privacy Concerns than Physical Representations of the Same 
Content 
The sheer amount of personal data transported in a phone, laptop, or 
other electronic device increases individual privacy concerns.237  Even before 
the digital era, the Supreme Court implied that when an extensive amount of 
property is searched, it may be outside the scope of a warrant exception.238  
More recently in both Riley v. California and Carpenter v. United States, the 
Court noted that accumulation of personal data can pose increased privacy 
                                                          
 232.  See infra Section II.A. 
 233.  See infra Section II.B. 
 234.  See infra Section II.C. 
 235.  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2003) (citing United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540 (1985)). 
 236.  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (third party doctrine); Riley 
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (search incident to lawful arrest exception).  
 237.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.  
 238.  See Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 347–48 (1957) (per curiam) (finding the search 
and seizure of the entire contents of the defendants’ cabin upon their arrest without a warrant was 
not permitted). 
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concerns.239  Smaller amounts of personal information may be revealing in 
themselves, but when personal information is aggregated, further inferences 
about a person’s life can readily be made.240  Cell phones and other common 
electronic devices often carry an incredible amount of personal data.241 Ad-
ditionally, these devices often contain different types of personal data (for 
example, calendars and schedules, contact lists, geolocation history, photos 
and videos, internet and application usage) that prove even more revealing 
when aggregated.242 
In determining whether a forensic laptop search was reasonable, the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cotterman estimated that the average laptop 
hard drive could store the information contained in five floors of an academic 
library.243  The Fourth Circuit echoed these assessments in United States v. 
Kolsuz, explaining that the quantity of data “stored on smartphones . . . 
dwarfs the amount of personal information that can be carried over a bor-
der . . . in luggage or a car.”244  After a month of extracting data from 
Kolsuz’s phone, the government generated 896 pages of personal data.245 
These observations imply that an individual carrying a phone or laptop has a 
greater privacy interest in that device than in all the other property with which 
they would have otherwise traditionally traveled.246 
                                                          
 239.  See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed 
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions.”); Carpenter, 138 
S. Ct. at 2217–18 (noting that because CSLI data is constantly recorded it provides a “deep reposi-
tory of historical location information,” which shows a suspect’s every movement for potentially 
years of his life). 
 240.  See GRAY, supra note 22, at 109–16 (discussing the “mosaic theory” explanation of how 
aggregated data poses a greater privacy interest than the sum of an individual’s interests in individ-
ual pieces of information).  
 241.  See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 542 
(2005) (explaining a typical computer sold in 2005 with eighty gigabytes of storage roughly equated 
to forty million pages of text or all the books on one floor of an academic library).  
 242.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489; see also James Carmichael, Google Knows You Better Than You 
Know Yourself, ATLANTIC, (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/ 
08/google-knows-you-better-than-you-know-yourself/378608/ (discussing how Google’s aware-
ness of a person’s calendar, internet browsing, shopping history, and geolocation enables their soft-
ware to make predictions about an person’s behavior before the person themself, such as when and 
where a person needs to go, what a person may need or want to buy, or what website they want to 
visit). 
 243.  709 F.3d 952, 964 (2013) (citing Kerr, supra note 241, at 542). 
 244.  United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 138, 145 (2018).  
 245.  Id. 
 246.  See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they 
have received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article 
they have read—nor would they have any reason to attempt to do so.”).  But see United States v. 
Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018) (reasoning that the vast amount of information on 
electronic devices does not indicate they should be treated differently in a border search, but rather 
are the same as searching “a recreational vehicle filled with personal effects or a tractor-trailer 
loaded with boxes of documents”).  
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Additionally, the nature of the data found on electronic devices in-
creases individual privacy interests.  The earliest customs statutes which au-
thorized warrantless searches of ships and containers at ports of entry specif-
ically distinguished this type of search from the search of homes and 
dwellings, which were more limited and required a warrant.247  In Riley, the 
Court reasoned that the kind of data discoverable on a cell phone exposes 
more about a person than what would be found after “ransacking his house 
for everything which may incriminate him.”248 The Court recognized that 
phones now contain many of the “sensitive records previously found in the 
home,” like medical and banking information.249  Indeed, given the creation 
of other smart devices and applications, cell phones and computers can pro-
vide a direct view into what is going on inside someone’s home.250  Electronic 
devices also often store information that may be privileged from government 
investigations, such as legal documents between attorneys and clients, doc-
tor-patient records, journalist information, and spousal communications.251 
Given both the nature and quantity of the information provided by these 
devices, the Riley Court concluded that they “are not just another technolog-
ical convenience.  With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold 
for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”252  This assessment remains un-
changed whether a device is located inside the United States or brought to 
the international border. 
Furthermore, increasing reliance on digital devices for all aspects of 
day-to-day life along with increased international travel limit many individ-
uals’ ability to reduce potential exposure to intrusive border searches.253  The 
Supreme Court explained in Carpenter and Riley that the pervasive use of 
cell phones, which have now become a “feature of human anatomy,” requires 
                                                          
 247.  United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). 
 248.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490–91 (quoting United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d 
Cir. 1926) (Learned Hand, J.)). 
 249.  Id. at 2491. 
 250.  See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 563–64 (D. Md. 2014) (describing 
the iCam application on iPhones that can access a web cam on a home computer, potentially allow-
ing “the touch of a button” to turn “a cell phone search [into] a house search”); Examining Warrant-
less Smartphone Searches at the Border: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Spending Oversight 
and Emergency Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 115th Cong. 24 
(statement of Laura K. Donohue, Agnes N. Williams Research Professor; Director, Center on Na-
tional Security and the Law; and Director, Center on Privacy & Technology, Georgetown Law) 
[hereinafter Statement of Laura K. Donohue] (discussing the Blink Home Monitor application that 
allows real-time information on what is happening in someone’s house on their cell phone). 
 251. Statement of Laura K. Donohue, supra note 250, at 24–25. 
 252.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
 253.  United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 145 (2018) (finding it is not “realistic nor reasonable 
to expect the average traveler” to not carry digital devices with them) (quoting Saboonchi, 990 F. 
Supp. 2d at 556). 
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them to be treated differently than other personal property.254  Since Riley, 
smartphone ownership has continued to grow, and today roughly eighty-five 
percent of Americans own a smartphone.255  Reliance on smartphones to as-
sist in regular tasks has also continued to grow.256  Over half of smartphone 
owners use their device within fifteen minutes of waking up in the morning 
and until within fifteen minutes of going to bed at night.257  This increased 
reliance makes it implausible for users concerned with their privacy to just 
leave their electronic devices at home when traveling.258  Similarly, more 
people have adopted lifestyles that require travel in and out of the United 
States.  International personal travel has become cheaper, easier, and more 
prevalent.259  The globalization of economic markets has also led to signifi-
cantly increasing international business travel,260  which is expected to grow 
nearly forty percent between 2015 and 2020.261 
Overall, electronic devices are designed and used today in ways that 
significantly implicate an individual’s privacy interests.  Although expecta-
tions of privacy are less at the border than in other public spaces, it is unlikely 
that the Supreme Court will continue to accept the proposition that individual 
privacy interests in the digital content found on electronic devices should be 
valued the same as paper copies of the same information.262 
                                                          
 254.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484).  
 255.  DELOITTE, 2018 GLOBAL MOBILE CONSUMER SURVEY: US EDITION 7 (2018), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/technology-media-and-telecommunications/arti-
cles/global-mobile-consumer-survey-us-edition.html.  This is over a twenty percent increase from 
2014, the year Riley was decided.  Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 6, 2018), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/. 
 256.  DELOITTE, supra note 255, at 4. 
 257.  DELOITTE, 2017 GLOBAL MOBILE CONSUMER SURVEY: US EDITION 2 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology-media-telecommuni-
cations/us-tmt-2017-global-mobile-consumer-survey-executive-summary.pdf. 
 258.  See supra note 253.  
 259.  See Max Roser, Tourism, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2018), https://ourworldindata.org/tour-
ism (showing international tourist arrivals have continued to increase exponentially since the end of 
the World War II era, from 25.2 million in 1950 to 1.24 billion in 2016).  
 260.  Per Gustafson, Work-Related Travel, Gender and Family Obligations, 20 WORK, EMP. & 
SOC’Y 513, 514 (2006).  
 261.  Global Business Travel Spending Growth Forecast from 2015 to 2020, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/324786/global-business-travel-spending-growth-forecast/ (last 
accessed Mar. 10, 2019); see also Jordan Bishop, Business Travel Continues to Gain in Importance, 
FORBES, (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bishopjordan/2017/12/31/business-
travel/#33db39385cce (predicting business travel would grow by twenty-five percent between 2013 
and 2018). 
 262.  Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014) (“That is like saying a ride on horse-
back is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”).  
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2.  That Cell Phone Searches Are Investigations of a Traveler’s 
Property, Not Person, Does Not Automatically Mean They 
Cannot Be Particularly Offensive 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that because 
border searches of electronic devices are searches of individual property, not 
a person’s body, they are routine border searches that require no level of in-
dividualized suspicion.263  This bright line rule, however, is not clearly re-
flected in the Supreme Court’s precedent.264  The Fourth Amendment is not 
limited to protection of “persons” but also contemplates searches of “papers, 
and effects.”265  Although, the Supreme Court has not yet decided a case in 
which it determined a particular search of property at the border required rea-
sonable suspicion, it has not disclosed this possibility.266 
In Flores-Montano, the Court explained that disassembly and reassem-
bly of a vehicle’s gas tank was not an unreasonable search of individual prop-
erty at the border.267  The Court, however, has never said that a search of 
property could not be “particularly unreasonable.”268  Other circuits have 
classified border searches of property as unreasonable without individualized 
suspicion.269  Furthermore, as discussed, although electronic devices are 
property and not literally part of an individual “person,” cell phones and other 
electronic devices are a distinguishable type of personal property vastly dif-
ferent from a vehicle fuel tank.270 
The Eleventh Circuit first articulated three factors that “contribute to the 
personal indignity [of travelers]” and would indicate a border search was un-
reasonable in United States v. Vega-Barvo.271  These factors included “(1) 
physical contact between the searcher and the person searched; (2) exposure 
                                                          
 263.  United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Vergara, 
884 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2018).   
 264.  United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2 (2004) (citing United States v. 
Ramsey, 431 U.S at 618 n.13).  
 265.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1014, 1017 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (describing the essential protection of personal papers em-
bedded in the history of the Fourth Amendment). 
 266.  Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 n.2. 
 267.  Id. at 155. 
 268.  Id. at 154 n.2 (leaving open the question of what an offensive border search or property 
might be).  
 269.  See, e.g., United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding an intrusive search 
of a trailer was a nonroutine border search); United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(finding an intrusive search of a suspicious package was a nonroutine border search); United States 
v. Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding an intrusive search of a camper was a nonroutine 
border search). 
 270.  See supra Section II.A.1; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[T]he 
proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude [cell phones] were an important feature of human 
anatomy.”). 
 271.  729 F.2d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1984). 
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of intimate body parts; and (3) use of force.”272  Though certainly relevant, 
these factors have not been universally adopted by other circuits, or the Su-
preme Court, as an all-inclusive list.273  Furthermore, developments in tech-
nology since these factors were first articulated have since produced other 
ways individuals can be personally humiliated.  Cell phones and other elec-
tronic devices often store intimate conversations, photos, and other content 
that if involuntarily revealed to strangers could cause excessive embarrass-
ment.274  Although these indignities may not be as offensive as a strip search, 
the embarrassment that might be suffered is arguably more akin to a search 
of an individual person than that of the inner-mechanics of their vehicle.275 
B.  Searches of Electronic Devices Do Not Clearly Support the 
Government’s Justification for Warrantless Border Searches 
The Supreme Court’s recognition in Riley and Carpenter that the nature 
of cell phone data raises privacy concerns to such a degree that it is beyond 
the reach of some traditional warrantless investigations endorses careful scru-
tiny of other contexts where the government regularly collects similar infor-
mation without a warrant.  The Court’s reasoning in Riley also raises the 
question of whether digital property should be treated differently, not only 
because of individual privacy concerns, but also because the government’s 
interests in obtaining digital content may be different than its interest in other 
physical items.276 
                                                          
 272.  See supra note 183 and accompanying text.   
 273.  See e.g., United States v. Brakes, 842 F.2d 509, 512–13 (1st Cir.1988) (listing multiple 
additional factors assessed to determine if a search is not routine, including “whether the suspect’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, are abrogated by the search”). 
 274.  In a recent study, thirty-one percent of people worldwide admitted they shared intimate 
content on their phone or computer.  Lianne Caetano, Trust and Relationships in the Mobile Era, 
MCAFFEE (Feb. 4, 2014), https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/mobile-and-iot-secu-
rity/love-relationships-tech-mobile-2014/.  Sixty percent of those who did saved or stored the inti-
mate content on their devices.  Id.  Other types of very personal data are also communicated through 
cell phones.  People are increasingly seeking psychotherapy, emotional, and financial counseling 
through texting or other applications on their smartphones.  See, e.g., TALKSPACE, 
https://www.talkspace.com/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (advertising the ability to talk or text with 
a mental health therapist on one’s cell phone instead of going to an office for an appointment.); 
PENNY, https://www.pennyapp.io/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (describing a personal finance app 
that tracks an individual’s income and spending, and gives personal finance advice based on infor-
mation obtained from banking and credit accounts). 
 275.  See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (2013) (en banc) (calling a forensic 
search of a laptop a “strip search”).  
 276.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485–88 (2014) (determining that cell phone 
searches do not serve the governmental interests underlying the search incident to arrest exception). 
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1.  The Purpose of the Border Search Exception 
Although warrantless border search authority has been recognized since 
the inception of the Fourth Amendment,277 the practice is not without lim-
its.278  In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, the Court recognized that, 
despite the long history of the border search exception, a border inspection is 
akin to other modern law enforcement practices, “[t]he permissibility of 
[which] is judged by ‘balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests.’”279  As articulated in Riley, the governmental interests relevant to this 
inquiry are not to be construed so broadly as to include anything that would 
benefit the government.280  Rather, only the governmental interests that give 
rise to the warrant exception should be weighed in a Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness inquiry, to prevent an “untether[ing] of the rule from [its] justi-
fications.”281  The Riley Court concluded that the governmental interests 
upon which the search incident to arrest exception rests—officer safety and 
preservation of evidence—are not meaningfully furthered by cell phone 
searches.282  The governmental interests supported by warrantless border 
searches should be similarly assessed. 
The border search exception is based on the government’s important in-
terest in controlling who and what enters its sovereign territory.283  More spe-
cifically, border searches allow the government to ensure the collection of 
duties on goods, stop the introduction of contraband, and prevent unlawful 
entry of individuals.284  Following the terrorist attacks that took place on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, courts have also found that ensuring the government is not 
                                                          
 277.  United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–17 (1976) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 623 (1886)). 
 278.  See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540–41 (1985) (citing Ramsey, 
431 U.S. at 618 n.13) (explaining that some border searches require individualized suspicion). 
 279.  Id. at 537 (first citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983); 
then citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); and then citing Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)). 
 280.  See Riley, 134 S. Ct at 2484–85 (determining whether a cell phone search supports the 
specific legitimate governmental interests that justify the search incident to arrest exception).  
 281.  Id. at 2485. 
 282.  Id. at 2485–88. 
 283.  United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004) (citing Ramsey, 431 U.S. 
at 619) (“The Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at 
its zenith at the international border.”). 
 284.  See, e.g., id. (stating the executive branch may conduct warrantless border searches “in 
order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband”) (quoting 
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 
(“[N]ational self protection reasonably require[es] one entering the country to identify himself as 
entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.” (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 32, 45 (1925))); United States v. 12 200–Ft. 
Reels of Super 8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (recognizing that border search authority is 
justified by the need to prevent smuggling and enforce import restrictions); Almeida–Sanchez v. 
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hindered in its ability to stop terrorists or their weapons from entering the 
country justifies the border exception.285  The border search, however, is not 
definitely excluded from the warrant requirement in the interest of uncover-
ing evidence of any criminal activity.286 
In one of its earliest opinions discussing warrantless border searches, 
the Court specifically distinguished between the search and seizure of dutia-
ble goods and contraband, and the search and seizure of papers that could be 
used as evidence of unlawful activity, declaring that while the former was 
permitted, the latter violated the Fourth Amendment.287  Although this “mere 
evidence rule,” which had been broadly applied to other types of searches 
and seizures, was abandoned by the Court in 1967,288 the discussion in Boyd 
reflects that the traditional justification for warrantless border searches was 
to uncover prohibited items or those subject to duties entering the country.289 
                                                          
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, (1973) (discussing the power to exclude aliens from entering this 
country); United States v. Thirty–Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (explaining customs 
officials inspections are “an old practice . . . intimately associated with excluding illegal articles 
from the country”); see also Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 621 (rejecting the proposition that the border 
exception is not based on the exigent circumstances). 
 285.  In March 2003, portions of other federal agencies including the U.S. Customs Service, 
immigration inspectors, agriculture inspectors, and border patrol agents combined to form CBP, 
which moved all of these previously separate responsibilities under the newly created DHS.  CBP 
Through the Years, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/about/history 
(last modified Nov. 8, 2017).  Since then, CBP has declared one of its primary tasks is to “keep[] 
terrorists and their weapons out of the U.S.”  About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, 
https://www.cbp.gov/about (last modified Nov. 21, 2016).  Arguably, this does not radically change 
the traditional role of screening travelers for lawful status to enter the country and identifying weap-
ons and other contraband at the border.  Courts have avoided trying to answer what other specific 
role can or should CBP play in preventing terrorism but have often been deferential to the govern-
ment’s interest in conducting a search when terrorist activity is potentially involved.  See, e.g., Tabaa 
v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing CBP may detain and search based on “the 
compelling governmental interest in preventing potential terrorists from entering the United 
States”); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) (raising concerns about the need 
to uncover “terrorist communications” or “terrorist plans” during a border search). 
 286.  United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Us-
ing border searches for a purpose unrelated to border control—such as general crime prevention—
raises a wholly different issue.”).  Some courts have concluded that where evidence of a crime is 
found while conducting a legitimate border search for contraband, it may properly be seized.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Schoor, 597 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding customs officials could 
seize documents found searching individuals arrested for suspected heroin trafficking).  This kind 
of search, however, is often allowable based on the search incident to arrest exception or the plain 
view doctrine and need not be construed as part of the border search exception.  See id. at 1306–07 
(noting the customs agents seized the documents “incident to a lawful arrest”).  
 287.  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). 
 288.  Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309–10 (1967). 
 289.  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622–23; Statement of Laura K. Donohue, supra note 250, at 11.  This is 
also consistent with the Court’s discussion of the border search in Carroll v. United States, in which 
the court noted it would be appropriate for any car to be stopped at the border in order for govern-
ment agents to ensure it was not transporting liquor or other contraband.  Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). 
 596 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:563 
The Court’s holding in United States v. Ramsey, allowing the opening 
of international mail suspected of containing contraband, is consistent with 
endorsing a limited purpose of the border search exception.290  The Court 
explained that envelopes subject to search when carried across the border 
would be subject to the same search criteria if they were mailed from abroad 
because “[i]t is their entry into this country from without it that makes a re-
sulting search ‘reasonable.’”291  As noted by the Court, however, the search 
in question was conducted in accordance with federal statutes and regulations 
which required reasonable suspicion that contraband was inside the envelope 
to initiate the search and explicitly prohibited customs personnel from read-
ing any of the correspondence without a warrant.292  The search was con-
ducted to ensure no illegal drugs were smuggled between papers, not to see, 
for example, if the papers contained a letter describing a rendezvous location 
for a future drug transaction.293  In his concurrence, Justice Powell further 
emphasized the significance of the statutory preconditions in the case, stating 
that the statute adequately protected individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.294  Other warrantless border searches upheld by the Supreme Court 
since, were conducted with the purpose and effect of discovering illegal ma-
terials from being brought into the country.295 
A cell phone search will not uncover goods to which duties are owed or 
other physical contraband.296  Cell phones and other digital devices similarly 
do not carry agricultural pests, and an examination of their digital content 
will not reveal drugs, weapons, or other immediate threats of physical 
                                                          
 290.  United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1976).  
 291.  Id. at 620. 
 292.  Id. at 611, 623.  Today, federal regulations continue to limit customs officers’ ability to 
open and read international mail.  See 19 C.F.R. § 145.3 (2018) (allowing customs officers to open 
sealed letter class mail only if it they have reasonable cause to suspect the presence of merchandise 
or contraband and prohibiting customs officers from reading any correspondence without a warrant 
or the written consent of the sender or addressee).   
 293.  Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 609.  A customs officer first noticed the envelopes, mailed from a 
known drug source country, seemed bulky, felt like there was something other than paper inside, 
and weighed three to six times the normal weight of a letter before opening them.  Id.; see also 
United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“The case did 
not involve reading anything within the envelopes, nor did it involve an effort to obtain evidence 
of criminal activity unconnected to the customs laws.”). 
 294.  Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring).  Justice Powell agreed to join the majority 
opinion only if the precedential effect of the decision should be confined to international mail 
searches conducted in accordance with the statute.  Id.  Justice Powell also noted the statute pro-
tected individual First Amendment rights as well.  Id. 
 295.  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 150 (2004) (upholding a warrantless 
search that led to the discovery of illegal drugs in the gas tank of an automobile); United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 532–33 (1985) (holding that a search that led to the discovery 
of illegal drugs in the alimentary canal was valid). 
 296.  United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2018) (Pryor, J., dissenting) 
(“[C]ell phones do not contain the physical contraband that border searches traditionally have pre-
vented from crossing the border.”). 
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harm.297  Digital contraband, including child pornography, can be obtained 
in searches of cell phones and electronic devices.298  However, CBP policy 
and practices do not distinguish between conducting a search based on sus-
picion that there is digital contraband present from suspicion that there is 
“activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP” or, even 
more broadly, suspicion that there is “a national security concern.”299 
Although lower courts have generally embraced a broad understanding 
of the “national sovereignty” interest justifying warrantless border searches, 
contemporary law enforcement practices have pushed its limits.300  Some 
lower courts have determined that a government agent at the border could 
read the entire contents of an individual’s diary in order to find evidence of 
criminal activity under the border exception.301  Others, though, have con-
cluded that an interest in uncovering evidence alone is not close enough to 
the reasons underlying the border search exception to justify a suspicionless 
search, especially where individual privacy interests are particularly ele-
vated.302  As the intimate details about peoples’ lives, privileged and other 
sensitive information are increasingly transported across the border in digital 
devices, it is worth considering for what purposes the government should be 
given unquestionable access.303  An unchecked, unlimited ability to access 
                                                          
 297.  Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485–86 (2014) (explaining that digital data cannot 
itself cause harm to arresting officers). 
 298.  E.g., United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1235 (2018) (explaining that the govern-
ment’s interest in stopping contraband from entering the country does not depend on whether the 
illegal images are digital or physical photographs). 
 299.  See CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 115. 
 300.  Two circuits have upheld searches in which CBP searched and seized personal documents 
from travelers who were being investigated for financial crimes unrelated to international customs 
law, immigration, terrorism, or their travel abroad by the FBI during a border search. United States 
v. Levy, 803 F.3d 120, 121 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Gurr, 471 F.3d 144, 147–50 (D.C. Cir. 
2006).  As the CBP has become more integrated with other law enforcement agencies, potential to 
investigate travelers for unrelated activity has grown.  See Law Enforcement Information Sharing, 
OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/organi-
zations/ise/ise-archive/ise-additional-resources/2142-law-enforcement-information-sharing (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2019) (describing how information sharing among all law enforcement agencies 
has significantly expanded to better combat threats of terrorism, but the same advancements “are 
also applicable to other types of crime”). 
 301.  United States v. Blackwell, No. 19-CR-0138, 2018 WL 6804803, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 
2018); United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 563 (D. Md. 2014).  
 302.  United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 59 (D.D.C. 2014), appeal dismissed, No. 15-
3035, 2014 WL 5237696 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 14, 2015). 
 303.  United States v. Molina–Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 2018) (Costa, J., concurring) 
(“If contraband is not being electronically concealed in phones and computers, does the government 
still have as compelling an interest in searching those items at the border?”). 
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individual’s personal information could potentially allow for abuse of this 
process and contradict constitutional values.304 
2.  Border Searches Used to Investigate Unrelated Activity 
CBP’s broad policy, allowing extensive warrantless searches of elec-
tronic devices, yielding potentially hundreds of pages of personal data, when-
ever there is a hunch that any illegal activity is ongoing, certainly makes the 
border search appear as if it can be used for general policing.305  Other 
searches conducted pursuant to different special needs warrant exceptions 
have been struck down based on a showing that despite other cursory pur-
poses, the “central and indispensable feature” of the search regime was for 
general law enforcement.306  As discussed above, it is far from clear that a 
general law enforcement or evidence-gathering purpose underlies the border 
exception.307 
Still, even if the border search exception is construed to support a broad 
national security purpose, the common law enforcement technique of tagging 
individuals for search at the border seems to contradict the veracity of the 
“national security” justification.308  In several cases, a law enforcement or 
intelligence agency flags an individual’s name as associated with some other 
investigatory interest in a shared database.309  However, instead of further 
                                                          
 304.  In his opening statement in the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight 
and Emergency Management hearing on smartphone searches at the border, Ranking Member Sen-
ator Gary C. Peters described concerns that current CBP policies function as a “backdoor travel 
ban,” unfairly impacting Arab and Muslim-Americans, create “an immense disincentive to travel,” 
“hurt[] families,” and “impact[] commerce.”  Examining Warrantless Smartphone Searches at the 
Border: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Spending Oversight and Emergency Mgmt. of the S. 
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs Comm., 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Sen. Peters, 
Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Fed. Spending Oversight and Emergency Mgmt.).  
 305. See CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 115; United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 
1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2018) (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 306.  Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69–70, 80 (2001) (finding drug testing of 
pregnant women and reporting results to police without the patient’s consent or a warrant was un-
constitutional); United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967–68, 974 (9th Cir. 1998) (deciding ad-
ministrative search scheme that allowed the government to search any personal belongings carried 
into a federal building, not only for weapons or explosives but for anything violating federal regu-
lations including drug paraphernalia, was unconstitutional). 
 307.  See supra Section II.B.1; see also Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1317 (Pryor, J., dissenting) (finding 
a general law enforcement purpose for border searches “quite far removed” from the purpose of the 
warrant exception); see also United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 297 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(Costa, J., concurring) (noting the Supreme Court has not commented much about the alternative 
justification for the border search as a tool for protecting “national security”). 
 308.  See United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 32, 57 (D.D.C. 2015) (questioning how national 
security concerns can underlie a warrantless forensic laptop search at the border where the owner 
“posed so little of an ongoing threat to national security, that he was permitted to board his flight”). 
 309.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TECS SYSTEM: PLATFORM 18 (2016).  TECS is an infor-
mation sharing platform used and managed by CBP that allows multiple federal law enforcement 
agencies to use and record information about potential travelers that may raise a security concern.  
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pursuing the individual, the government may wait until the individual arrives 
at a border crossing, then seize and extensively search their electronic devices 
and other property.310  In other cases, where an individual is suspected of a 
crime, the government has used the border search authority of CBP to access 
information or records the agency would not otherwise have access to if they 
were inside the country, even where the investigation is for a crime unrelated 
to the individual’s international travel, customs laws, immigration, or terror-
ism.311  Certainly, the government should not be discouraged or thwarted in 
its ability to pursue credible complex threats to our nation’s security.  Inter-
national travel, however, should not provide a loophole to Fourth Amend-
ment protections and allow the government to seize personal information un-
related to the justifications embedded in general sovereignty interests at the 
border.312  Additionally, electronic files that may implicate a criminal plan or 
conspiracy that threatens national security may be regulated or obtained by 
other means and may not actually present such a compelling reason to allow 
intrusive warrantless searches of electronic devices at the border.313 
                                                          
Id. at 1.  FBI personnel input information indicating an individual is suspected of involvement in a 
violation of federal law and what if any actions should be taken by CBP if and when that person 
attempts to cross the border.  Id. at 18.   
 310.  In one case, David House, a U.S. citizen, was working with the Bradley Manning Support 
Network to raise legal defense funds for a soldier who has since pleaded guilty to providing classi-
fied documents to WikiLeaks.  Brian Hauss, Documents Shed Light on Border Laptop Searches, 
ACLU (Sep. 9, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/docu-
ments-shed-light-border-laptop-searches.  Although he was not questioned by law enforcement of-
ficers in the United States, a lookout was placed in the TECS database stating that he was wanted 
for questioning about a leak of classified material.  Id.  The lookout further stated that customs 
officers should conduct a full secondary inspection of him and his bags and secure his digital media.  
Id.  When he returned from a vacation in Mexico to Chicago O’Hare International Airport, he was 
questioned by CBP and his laptop was seized and searched.  Id.  House later filed a lawsuit alleging 
the government’s action violated the Fourth and First Amendments.  Id.  The government reached 
a settlement with House in 2013 in which the government agreed to turn over information they had 
gathered about House.  Government Documents Released Under House v. Napolitano Settlement, 
ACLU (Sep. 9, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/government-documents-released-un-
der-house-v-napolitano-settlement.  
 311.  In one case, a traveler was being investigated by the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) 
for securities fraud.  United States v. Levy, 803 F.3d 120, 121 (2d Cir. 2015).  When he returned to 
the United States from a trip abroad, his notebook was searched and copied by customs agents in 
support of DEA’s ongoing investigation.  Id.  In another case, several financial documents were 
searched and seized from a traveler at an international airport who was suspected of credit union 
fraud.  United States v. Gurr, 471 F.3d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 312.  Susan Stellin, The Border Is a Back Door for U.S. Device Searches, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/business/the-border-is-a-back-door-for-us-device-
searches.html. 
 313.  See Statement of Laura K. Donohue, supra note 250, at 23–24 (discussing the ability for 
the government to obtain digital contraband through other means and that such matters may fall 
within the scope of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act); see also United States v. Vergara, 
884 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2018) (Pryor, J., dissenting) (questioning whether border searches 
are the best means of obtaining “borderless” digital content).  
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C.  Tiers of Intrusiveness  
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits and CBP have endorsed policies that dis-
tinguish two types of electronic device border searches: manual or basic 
searches, which do not require individualized suspicion, and forensic or ad-
vanced searches, which require reasonable suspicion.314  Proposed legislation 
in the Senate takes on a similar format, proscribing more stringent require-
ments for forensic searches than for manual searches.315  It is not clear, how-
ever, that either of these proposed plans rely upon meaningful, workable dis-
tinctions. 
1.  Problems with Creating a Tiered Search Scheme 
Drawing distinctions between levels of intrusiveness for digital device 
searches may become an impractically difficult task as technology quickly 
changes.  The Supreme Court expressly rejected the government’s proposi-
tion in Riley to allow at least less intrusive searches of cell phones without a 
warrant.316  The Court first noted that law enforcement officers are best 
served by clear rules on what types of searches are permissible.317  The Court 
also reasoned that if a more flexible rule was adopted, as the law was being 
litigated, it would be hard to reach a point of clarity because the nature of 
electronic devices used by Americans will continue to change.318 
Additionally, although CBP’s current distinction between what consti-
tutes a basic or advanced search may be administrable, it does not conclu-
sively reflect the level of intrusiveness actually at stake.319  The CBP policy 
considers a search assisted by electronic hardware, where presumably large 
amounts of files can be extracted from an electronic device, to be more intru-
sive than a search conducted by customs agents for an indefinite period of 
time in or out of the presence of the device owner.320  The current distinction 
appears to turn on how much data can be extracted from the device, however, 
because the standard does not limit the amount of time an agent may search 
                                                          
 314.  United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 843, 858 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Cotterman, 
709 F.3d 952, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2013); see CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 115. 
 315.  S. 2462, 115th Cong. (2018); see supra notes 129–137 and accompanying text.  Notably, 
the proposed legislation delineates two tiers that require either reasonable suspicion (“manual 
search”) or probable cause and a warrant (“forensic search”).  S. 2462 § 2.  Whereas, the CBP policy 
calls for no level of suspicion (“basic search”) or reasonable suspicion (“advanced search”).  CBP 
DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 115, ¶¶ 5.1.3–.4. 
 316.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492–94 (2014).   
 317.  Id. at 2497. 
 318.  Id.  
 319.  United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 (4th Cir. 2018) (reasoning that CBP’s adoption 
of differentiating between manual and forensic searches, as recognized by the courts in United States 
v. Cotterman and United States v. Saboonchi, suggests that it is a “perfectly manageable” distinc-
tion). 
 320.  CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 115, at 4–5. 
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a device during a basic or manual search, it is unclear that proposition will 
always be true.321  Further, as discussed in Riley, even manual searches can 
be extremely revealing.322  As the digital forensic technology industry con-
tinues to grow, it is possible that extrinsic tools used to search the contents of 
a device may work more quickly, in a more targeted manner, and may per-
haps become less intrusive than a human agent combing through and viewing 
individual records on someone’s phone.323 
Furthermore, the distinction between manual searches and searches con-
ducted with the assistance of other electronic tools cuts against law enforce-
ment best practices.324  Digital forensic experts agree that manually sifting 
through files on someone’s device is not a “forensically sound” practice be-
cause it can affect the content and state of the device.325  In order to ensure 
any evidence held on a cell phone can be properly admitted at a later trial, 
best practices advise that the original files and device should be minimally 
handled by investigators.326  Where it is necessary to access original digital 
evidence, only a person specifically trained for that purpose should do so and 
carefully document their actions.327 
Manual searches are also less preferable because it is more difficult to 
ensure only data that is actually on the device is searched and data stored on 
servers elsewhere is not inadvertently accessed.328  Because data stored re-
motely is not actually carried across the border, it cannot be obtained based 
on the border search exception.329  The current CBP policy instructs officers 
to ask travelers to put their device in airplane mode or try to do so themselves 
                                                          
 321.  Cf. S. 2462, 115th Cong. (2018) (describing any search that takes longer than four hours 
as a forensic search).   
 322.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–91 (discussing privacy concerns that arise during the manual 
search of a cell phone). 
 323.  See United States v. Wanjiku, No. 16 CR 296, WL 1304087, at *3 (M.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2017) 
(describing encase software that can generate a preview of only the photos stored on a phone in less 
than an hour).  See generally EnCase Mobile Investigator Product Overview, OPENTEXT, 
https://www.guidancesoftware.com/document/product-brief/encase-mobile-investigator-product-
overview (last visited Jan. 12, 2019). 
 324.  Wanjiku, WL 1304087, at *4 (“[Y]ou can’t just go on a phone and start tapping around and 
going through things because you affect the phone.”). 
 325.  Rodney McKemmish, When Is Digital Evidence Forensically Sound?, in ADVANCES IN 
DIGITAL FORENSICS IV, at  3–15 (Indrajit Ray & Sujeet Shenoi eds., 2008). 
 326.  Id. 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“[O]fficers searching a phone’s data 
would not typically know whether the information they are viewing was stored locally . . . or has 
been pulled from the cloud.”). 
 329.  Cf. id. (explaining that searching files stored on the cloud could not be permitted by the 
search incident to arrest exception).  Allowing the government to search files on the cloud would 
be like “finding a key in a suspect’s pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock 
and search a house.”  Id.   
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before searching it to block access to remotely stored data.330  This, however, 
could prove difficult where travelers are not cooperative or in cases where 
inspectors are not familiar with the functionality of individual devices.  Ex-
ternal forensic tools are designed with more precision to only download con-
tents actually stored on the device.331 
2.  A Warrant Requirement Will Ensure Access Only to Data That Is 
Constitutionally Permissible 
Requiring a warrant supported by probable cause for cell phone searches 
at the border is an administrable requirement that adequately protects privacy 
interests.332  Though some judges have suggested that it is best to let the ex-
ecutive branch or legislature develop policies that serve the government’s 
interest at the border,333 in Riley, the Court expressly rejected the same argu-
ment stating, “[T]he Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to 
government agency protocols.”334  Though it may impede law enforcement 
some, as noted in Riley, technology advancements have also made getting a 
warrant quicker and easier.335  Furthermore, though courts have differed in 
their determination of what standard should be applied to electronic device 
searches at the border, no challenge to a search in any of the four cases de-
cided by the circuit courts in 2018 actually excluded the evidence against a 
criminal defendant because the courts ultimately concluded that, even with-
out a warrant, a requisite level of individualized suspicion was present at the 
time of the search.336  This suggests that in the limited number of cases where 
cell phone searches are helpful to carry out CBP’s mission, officers may often 
be able to obtain the probable cause standard.337  Additionally, officers may 
                                                          
 330.  See CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 115, ¶ 5.1.2. 
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 332.  See GRAY, supra note 22, at 215.  
 333.  United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Kolsuz, 
890 F.3d 133, 148 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
 334.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.  
 335.  Id. at 2493 (discussing how in some jurisdictions police officers can obtain a warrant from 
a judge via email in less than fifteen minutes). 
 336.  See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1237 (finding at least reasonable suspicion was present); Kolsuz, 
890 F.3d at 148 (same); United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2018) (deciding 
no level of suspicion was required, but noting that the defendant did not challenge the lower court’s 
finding that at least reasonable suspicion existed); United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 
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 337.  Compare United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (explaining 
that “inspectors will rarely possess probable cause” to search alimentary canal smugglers), with 
Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d at 287 (determining officers had probable cause to search the cell phone 
of a traveler based on her illogical responses to the officer’s questions, her inconsistent travel plans, 
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still rely on other warrant exceptions at the border, including exigent circum-
stances to expediently search the contents of a phone when necessary condi-
tions are present.338 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recent examination of cell phone searches in tra-
ditional warrantless investigations raises the question of whether cell phone 
searches under other warrant exceptions should be reevaluated as well, in-
cluding the border search exception.339  As legal challenges to electronic de-
vice searches at the border continue to arise, courts should recognize their 
significant intrusion on individual privacy and tenuous relationship with the 
traditional justification for the border search exception.340  Though some 
courts and policymakers have proposed creating levels of electronic device 
searches that would require different degrees of suspicion, this approach may 
present distinctions that do not always mirror the privacy interests at stake 
and may discourage the use of best practices for searching digital content.341  
Alternatively, imposing a warrant requirement to search personal electronic 
devices at the border would avoid these problems and give clear guidance to 
law enforcement.342 
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